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During the ﬁrst half of the 20th century the length of the workweek in the U.S. declined,
and its distribution across wage deciles narrowed. The hypothesis is twofold. First,
technological progress, through the rise in wages and the decreasing cost of recreation,
made it possible for the average U.S. worker to afford more time off from work. Second,
changes in the wage distribution explain the changes in the distribution of hours. A
general equilibrium model is built to explore whether such mechanisms can
quantitatively account for the observations. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy
in 1900. It predicts 82% of the observed decline in hours, and most of the contraction in
their dispersion. The decline in the price of leisure goods accounts for 7% of the total
decline in hours.
& 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Between 1900 and 1950, in the U.S., the length of the workweek – the number of hours per week a worker spends on the
market – declined by a third. It went down from 60 to 40h. This decline was not even across workers: it beneﬁtted mostly
low-wage earners who used to work the most in 1900. Thus, the distribution of hours narrowed. This paper investigates,
quantitatively, the causes of these trends. The hypothesis is that (i) the rise in wages and the decline of recreation goods’
prices drove hours down; (ii) the changing distribution of wages is the reason for the contraction of the distribution of
hours. The model presented below predicts 82% of the observed decline in average hours, and most of the observed
contraction in their dispersion. Counterfactual experiments show that the decline in the price of leisure goods accounts for
7% of the total decline in hours.
Fig. 1 shows the trend in the length of the average workweek. It conveys two key messages. The ﬁrst is that the bulk of
the decline in hours took place before the second half of the 20th century. This observation motivates the restriction to the
pre-1950 period. The second message to be taken from Fig. 1 is that the decline in hours is not merely an artifact of the
changing gender composition of the labor force. More speciﬁcally, the labor market participation of married women started
to rise as early as in the 1900s. Since on average women work less than men, their participation could have driven hours
down. Fig. 1 shows that this effect is not quantitatively important.
Fig. 2 gives a disaggregated perspective on the trends in hours. It shows that the bulk of the decline was driven by
workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. More precisely, low-wage earners worked the longest week in 1900, but
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Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249they reduced their hours faster than high-wage earners. The result was a contraction in the distribution of hours across
wage groups.
1,2
At this point it is important to note a feature of the data that will be useful later, in the quantitative exercise. Speciﬁcally,
the relationship between hours and labor income is decreasing in the time series and in the 1900 cross section. Thus, the
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Fig.1. Average weekly hours worked – Notes: The data for total hours is from Whaples (1990, Table 2.1, part A), for the period 1830–1880, Kendrick (1961,
Tables A-IV and A-X) for the period for 1890–1940 and McGrattan and Rogerson (2004, Table 1) for the period 1950–2000. The series are spliced together
in 1890 and 1950. The source of data for male hours is Whaples (1990, Table 2.1, part B) for the period 1900–1950 and McGrattan and Rogerson (2004,
Table 2) for 1950–2000.
Fig. 2. Daily hours per wage decile.
1 The source for Fig. 2 is Costa (1998, Table 2). This ﬁnding is robust to disaggregation by gender, industry and occupation. Does the distribution of
daily hours translate into a similar distribution for weekly or annual hours? Did the 1890 low-wage workers have a long day at work because of a shorter
week? Costa presents evidence that this is not the case. For instance, those who reported Sunday at work where more likely to have longer hours in the
1890s. Likewise for those who reported no reduction or increase in Saturday hours. Similarly, workers with 3 months of unemployment in a year worked
less per day than workers with no unemployment during the year.
2 The picture is quite different in 2000, when high-wage earners are at the top of the distribution of hours. This situation has already been pointed out
in the literature. See, for example, Rı ´os-Rull (1993) and Aguiar and Hurst (2007).
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 238quantitative strategy is, in a ﬁrst step, to calibrate a general equilibrium model of the distribution of hours to the 1900 cross
section. Then, in a second step, to measure the respective contribution of various forces to the time series behavior of hours,
both in terms of average and dispersion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypothesis in two stages. The ﬁrst is a discussion of
the main mechanisms: the rise in wages, the contraction in their dispersion and the decline in the price of recreation goods.
The second stage lays out the reason why forces such as labor laws, taxes and home sector productivity are not part of the
main hypothesis. Section 3 presents a model of the level and dispersion of hours. The quantitative analysis and the main
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The hypothesis
2.1. Main forces
What are the forces behind the changing level and dispersion of hours between 1900 and 1950? The hypothesis is
twofold: First, technological progress, through the rise in wages and the decrease in the price of recreation goods, made it
easier and more attractive for workers to spend time off from work. Second, changes in the distribution of wages explain
the shifts in the distribution of hours. These mechanisms are now discussed in details.
Between 1900 and 1950 the U.S. real wage rate was multiplied by three – see Williamson (1995). The textbook analysis
of labor supply suggests that this alone could be the force behind the trend in hours. But is there an alternative? In fact, one
possible competing explanation comes from observing the decline in the relative price of recreation. To understand this
point let us adopt the perspective of the household production literature, as pioneered by authors such as Mincer (1962)
and Becker (1965). An important idea introduced in this literature is that some commodities are produced and consumed
within the household, by combining time and other goods. Consider then the home production of ‘leisure services.’ Leisure
services are enjoyed, for instance, from a bicycle ride in the country, time spent reading a book, listening to the radio,
exercising in a ﬁtness club, etc. Beside time, the production of leisure services requires another input which can be
purchased on the market: a ‘leisure good,’ e.g., bicycles, books, radios, golf passes, etc. One speciﬁcity of such goods is that
they are meant to use time, not to save it.
Fig. 3 shows that leisure goods became cheaper and more popular throughout the 20th century. Their prices, relative to
the consumer price index, decreased by 35% between 1900 and 1950, while their share in expenditures rose from 3% to 6%.
Owen (1969) reports econometric evidence that, beside real wages, the price of leisure goods signiﬁcantly affects leisure
time. More recently, Gonzales-Chape ´la (2007) estimates labor supply functions using PSID data and also ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
effect of the price of recreation goods on labor supply. Part of the exercise proposed in this paper is to quantify the effect of
the declining price of leisure activities on hours, during the period 1900–1950.
Let us now turn to the question of the changing distribution of hours. The hypothesis, here, is that it contracted because,
between 1900 and 1950, the distribution of wages contracted too. In other words, low-wage earners reduced their hours
faster because they experienced faster wage growth. Goldin and Katz (2001) present evidence that the wage distribution
was narrower in 1950 than at the end of the 19th century – see Table 1. The contraction of the wage distribution can be
linked to the rise in education which took place throughout the 20th century, and is illustrated in Fig. 4. The conjecture is
that the ﬂow of educated workers on the market slowed down wage growth relative to uneducated workers. The measure
of educational attainment in Fig. 4 is the proportion of individuals with a high school degree or more, in the 25-and-older
population. The reasons for this choice are the following. First, the high-school movement was a major transformation in
American education and it took place during the time period studied here.
3 Second, the reason for choosing the 25 and
older as the reference population is that the level of educational attainment of the current workforce depends on that of
current and past generations of workers.
2.2. Some alternatives
Other forces could be at play in the determination of the level and distribution of hours. These forces are, for example,
labor laws, unionization, taxation and home sector productivity. The paragraphs below do not attempt to dismiss these
alternatives and claim that they were irrelevant. Rather, the goal is to point out the arguments suggesting that they may
have been of secondary importance relative to technology. This paper is an attempt at measuring the importance of a few
speciﬁc mechanisms. It does not suggest that these mechanisms were the only ones at work.
The labor movement in the U.S. emerged during the 19th century with one of its major demands being an eight-hour
workday. So, to what extent did it affect the trends examined here? Panels A and B of Fig. 5 show that the trend in hours
was shared across most industrialized countries and sectors. For labor laws to have played a major role, different countries
would have had to pass similar laws at the same time and in most sectors: an unlikely event. Furthermore, Tomlins (2000)
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3 Goldin (2006) cites three transformations of American education. The rise in elementary schooling during the 19th century, the high-school
movement during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, and the rise in tertiary or higher education in the second half of the 20th century. Note that college
educated workers are counted in the measure of educational attainment used here.
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Fig. 3. Relative price of leisure goods and recreation’s share of expenditures – Notes: The data for the price of leisure goods is from Kopecky (2005); for the
recreation’s share of expenditures for the years 1900–1929: Lebergott (1996, Table A.1). After 1929 the data is taken from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
Table 1
Summary statistics for the dispersion of hours and earnings
Ratio of hours 90–10 earnings ratio
1890s 1.25 2.81
1950 1.18 1.85
Notes: The source of data is Costa (1998, Table 2) and Hazan (2006, Fig. 11) for the ﬁrst column. The ratio of hours corresponds to the ratio of hours for
workers in the bottom decile of the wage distribution to hours of workers in the top decile. The ﬁgures presented in the second column are derived from
Goldin and Katz (2001, Table 2.1) for the 1890s. Then, using Goldin and Margo (1992, Table 1), one can derive that the wage ratio in 1950 is about 86% of
what is was in 1940, which was 2.15. Hence 2:15   0:86 ¼ 1:85.
Fig. 4. Percentage of persons 25 and over with at least a high-school degree – Notes: The source of data is the digest of education statistics.
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 240indicates that many hours-related laws were passed in the late 19th and early 20th century in the U.S. However, no laws
constraining the hours of male workers were upheld by the courts who found them to be unconstitutional. It is also
interesting to note that, besides the reduction of weekly hours, households reduced their working time along other
margins. They now work fewer weeks per year – see Lebergott (1976) – and fewer years over their lifetime – see Kopecky
(2005). The eight-hour movement may have had little impact at these margins.
Can unionization account for the trend in hours? Panel C shows the unionization rate. Despite a spike in the early 1920s, the
noticeable movement appears to take place during the great depression. At this time, the trend in hours was already well under
way. Furthermore, one should note that unions are usually the vehicle through which workers can attempt to change labor laws.
This channel, as mentioned above, may not have been the most important in explaining the trends in hours.
How about changes in the taxation of labor income? Panel D of Fig. 5 shows that the marginal labor income tax rate
changed little before the 1940s. At this time, however, signiﬁcant reductions in hours already took place, as shown in Fig.1.
Finally, the fact that hours of working males declined during a period when the vast majority of housework was done by
women – see Fig. 1 – suggests that changes in the home sector productivity may have been of secondary importance.
3. The model
3.1. Environment
The economy is inhabited by a measure one of agents alive for one period of time, and with preferences deﬁned over a
generic consumption good, c, a leisure good, g, and leisure time, ‘. The production of the consumption good requires two
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 5. Hours by sectors and countries, the unionization rate and the marginal tax rate – Notes: The source of data is Kendrick (1961, Table A IX),
Huberman and Minns (2007, Table 1), Barro and Sahasakul (1986, Table 2) and Historical Statistics, Series D940, D948 and D127.
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 241types of labor: skilled and unskilled. The proportion of skilled and unskilled is endogenous. To become skilled, an agent has
to purchase education at a ﬁxed cost e, measured in units of the consumption good, which is the nume ´raire. If he does not,
he is unskilled. The wage rates per efﬁciency unit of skilled and unskilled labor are denoted ws and wu, respectively. In
addition to the consumption goods sector, another sector produces the leisure good and sells it at price p. The only input in
the leisure goods technology is the consumption good.
Agents are ex ante heterogenous. They are differentiated by their market ability, a, which is distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function A. Assume that A is log normal with mean ma and standard deviation sa. The
interpretation of a is as follows. An agent with ability a supplies a efﬁciency units of labor to the market, regardless
of his skill level. Hence, a skilled agent’s labor income is aws per hour. Similarly, an unskilled worker receives awu per hour
of work.
3.2. Households
Preferences are represented by the following utility function:
Uðc;g;‘Þ¼½ acs þð 1  aÞðmgr þð 1  mÞ‘rÞs=r 1=s, (1)
where a;m 2ð 0;1Þ and s;rp1. For convenience, denote the CES composite of g and ‘ by z. This composite can be
interpreted as a household good, produced through the technology described by the inner CES aggregator in U. Leisure
time, ‘, and the leisure goods g can then be thought of as intermediate inputs in the production of these goods. Let us call z
‘leisure’ for the sake of exposition. (It is understood that ‘, leisure time, is a different object than leisure itself.) The
parameters s and r govern elasticities of substitution. More precisely, the elasticity of substitution between g and ‘ is
1=ð1  rÞ; while 1=ð1  sÞ is the elasticity of substitution between c and z. This particular speciﬁcation is chosen because it
allows a non-constant recreation’s share of expenditure – see Fig. 3.
Denote by VsðaÞ the value of an agent who decides to purchase education and by VuðaÞ the value of an agent who does
not. The education choice is, therefore, summarized by
maxfVsðaÞ;VuðaÞg. (2)
A skilled agent solves the following maximization problem:
VsðaÞ¼max
c;g;‘
fUðc;g;‘Þ : c þ pg þ aws‘ þ e ¼ awsg (3)
while an unskilled solves
VuðaÞ¼max
c;g;‘
fUðc;g;‘Þ : c þ pg þ awu‘ ¼ awug. (4)
For later reference, it is convenient to introduce some notation. Let ciðaÞ, giðaÞ and ‘iðaÞ be the optimal decisions of an agent
with ability a and i 2f s;ug. Deﬁne also hiðaÞ¼1   ‘iðaÞ as the optimal labor supply. Finally, let siðaÞ¼pgiðaÞ=½awihiðaÞ  be the
leisure share.
3.2.1. Discussion
The household’s problem does not have an analytical solution in general. The education decision can be understood,
however, through a simpliﬁed version of the model where s ¼ r ¼ 0, that is where the elasticities of substitution are set to
one. (In addition, and to simplify the notation, let us ignore the weights a and m.) The utility function is then Uðc;g;‘Þ¼
lnðcÞþlnðgÞþlnð‘Þ: In this case, one can concentrate on the role of wages, ability and the cost of education in the decision
to acquire skills. One can show that the value functions are
VsðaÞ¼3lnðaws   eÞ lnðawsÞ lnðpÞ 3lnð3Þ,
VuðaÞ¼3lnðawuÞ lnðawuÞ lnðpÞ 3lnð3Þ.









a!aþ VsðaÞ VuðaÞ¼  1 .
The value functions of skilled and unskilled agents are represented in Fig. 6. When ws4wu, there exists a  2ð a;þ1Þ such
that Vsða Þ¼Vuða Þ. Furthermore, VsðaÞoVuðaÞ whenever aoa  and VsðaÞ4VuðaÞ whenever a4a . This proves the existence
of a marginal agent and rationalizes the education decision. The interpretation of the ﬁrst limit is that an agent with very
high ability always chooses to acquire education when ws4wu. The reason is that, for such an agent, the cost of education is
negligible. The interpretation of the second limit is as follows. An agent close to a has an ability level so low that, even if he
acquired skills and worked as much as possible, his income would only allow him to repay the education cost e but his
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 242consumption would be close to zero. His utility would then approach minus inﬁnity. Hence, this agent prefers to remain
unskilled.
4
Heterogeneity serves the following purpose. Education is costly so skilled agents tend to work more in order to pay for
it. This would be a counterfactual prediction, vis a ` vis the 1900 cross section distribution of hours. In the present
speciﬁcation, however, the hourly wage of a skilled worker is aws. Therefore, agents with large ability levels (i.e., a large) are
able to afford education and work less than others at the same time. Agents with ability below, but close to, a  will work
less than educated agents with ability levels above but close to a . On average, however, uneducated agents will work more
than educated agents. The particular form of the labor supply function is presented in Fig. 7.
3.3. Firms
The consumption goods sector is represented by a single ﬁrm with constant-returns-to-scale technology Fðs;uÞ. The
variables s and u represent inputs of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Let
Fðs;uÞ¼ð zssy þ zuuyÞ
1=y,
where yo1 and zs;zu40. The parameter y governs the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, while
zs and zu are factor-speciﬁc technical variables. The ﬁrm’s optimization problem is
max
s;u
fFðs;uÞ wss   wuug. (5)










Thus, whenever productivity growth is faster for skilled workers, the efﬁciency units of skilled labor increase faster than
that of unskilled, ceteris paribus.
Good g is produced by the leisure goods sector with the constant-returns-to-scale production function GðxÞ¼zgx, where
x represents inputs of the consumption goods and zg is a productivity parameter. The optimization problem of this sector is
max
x fpGðxÞ xg. (7)






Fig. 6. Value functions of skilled and unskilled when ws4wu.
4 Although the argument is made for a special case of the model, it is also possible to show that the shape of the value functions are the same in the
more general case where s ¼ 0 and ro1.
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In equilibrium, agents with abilities higher than a  choose to become skilled. Agents with abilities lower than a  remain
unskilled. The determination of a  is endogenous. Given prices fp;ws;wug and a threshold a , the equilibrium equations for
the labor markets are
Z
a 
hsðaÞadA ¼ s and
Z a 
huðaÞadA ¼ u, (8)





guðaÞdA ¼ GðxÞ. (9)





cuðaÞdA þ x ¼ Fðs;uÞ. (10)
To summarize, an equilibrium consists of (i) allocations for households, csðaÞ;gsðaÞ;‘ sðaÞ and cuðaÞ;guðaÞ;‘ uðaÞ for all a; (ii)
allocations for ﬁrms, s;u; and x; (iii) prices ws, wu and p and (iv) a partition of agents between skilled and unskilled such
that
(i) Agents choose their education optimally given prices, or Vsða Þ¼Vuða Þ,
(ii) The allocations csðaÞ;gsðaÞ;‘ sðaÞ solve problem (3) given prices,
(iii) The allocations cuðaÞ;guðaÞ;‘ uðaÞ solve problem (4) given prices,
(iv) The allocations s;u solve problem (5) given prices,




The computational experiment is a comparative static exercise. Two equilibria are computed. One corresponds to the
U.S. economy in 1900 and the other to 1950. The time-invariant parameters of the model (preferences and technology) are
chosen using a priori information or are calibrated to match key statistics of the 1900 U.S. economy. The time varying
parameters (technological progress) are chosen to compute the second equilibrium. It is important to note that, in this
exercise, the time series behavior of hours, both in level and dispersion, is left unconstrained. The mechanisms discussed in
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Unskilled workers: hu (a)













Fig. 7. Labor supply.
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 244Section 2.1 are evaluated on their ability to replicate the key observations related to hours of work. The details of the
experiment are discussed below.
The time-invariant parameters of the model are the preference parameters, the substitution parameter in the market
technology and the distribution parameters:
ða;m;s;r;y;ma;saÞ.
The time varying parameters are technology variables and the cost of education:
ðzs;zu;zg;eÞ.
Following Caselli and Coleman (2006), let y ¼ 1:0   1:0=1:24. Choose ma ¼ sa ¼ 1
2. Some robustness checks are done with
respect to these parameters (see Section 4.3). Finally, set the 1900 values of zu and zg to unity. One must choose values for
the four preference parameters a;m;s;r and the 1900 values of zs and e.
5 This is achieved by matching six statistics: the
average level of hours, their distribution between skilled and unskilled, the skill premium, the percentage of skilled
workers, the share of expenditures devoted to leisure goods, and the cost of education to GDP ratio. These statistics are
computed, from the model, as described in Table 2.
In Table 2, the symbols As and Au refer to the distribution of abilities, conditional on being skilled and unskilled,
respectively. Assuming that there are 100hours available for work during the week, the target for the average number of
hours is computed as the ratio of hours (58 in 1900) to 100. The dispersion of hours is summarized by the ratio of hours of
unskilled to skilled. The target value is taken from the data in Table 1. The skill premium is measured by the average hourly
earnings of skilled workers divided by that of unskilled workers. The target value is again taken from the data in Table 1.
The share of expenditures devoted to leisure is deﬁned in Section 3.2. Its value in 1900 is 3%, as transpires from Fig. 3.
Finally, the total cost of education is the price of education multiplied by the mass of skilled workers. In the U.S. data, the
cost of education is computed as the total expenditures of educational institutions divided by GDP.
6 Finally, the gross
domestic product, y, is the sum of expenditures on consumption, leisure goods and education.
Once the 1900 equilibrium is computed, move on to 1950. This is accomplished by letting the exogenous driving forces
change. Namely, let zg increase so that the price of leisure goods decreases as it does in the U.S. data. Let also the cost of
education, e, change so that its ratio to GDP increases from 1% to 3%, its value in the U.S. data in 1950. Finally, let zs and zu
change so that the number of skilled workers increases to 35% and GDP is multiplied by 2.7. Both these values correspond
to the actual changes observed in the U.S. economy between 1900 and 1950.
7 The average level of hours, their dispersion,
the skill premium and the share of expenditures devoted to recreation are left unconstrained. Table 3 summarizes the
parameters and targets for the 1950 equilibrium. The ﬁnal calibration is reported in Table 4.
4.2. Results
Table 5 presents the results of the computational experiment. The model generates a decline in hours of a magnitude
comparable to that observed in the U.S. data. This decline is mostly driven by unskilled workers, as the contraction in the
(model) dispersion of hours shows. This contraction in the distribution of hours, in turn, is fueled by the contraction in the
distribution of labor earnings. Speciﬁcally, the fact that the earnings of unskilled workers are increasing faster than that of
skilled workers implies that the former reduce their hours faster than the latter, causing the decrease in the dispersion of
hours.
At this point, it is good to remember that the 1950 statistics presented in Table 5 are not targets of the calibration
exercise. These results can therefore be interpreted as measures of the contribution of the exogenous technical parameters
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Table 2
Free parameters and targets for the 1900 equilibrium
Free parameters a;m;s;r;zs;e
Moments Model’s counterpart 1900 target
Average level of hours R
a  hsðaÞdA þ
R a 
huðaÞdA 0.58
Distribution of hours Ra 
huðaÞdAu=
R
a  hsðaÞdAs 1.25
Skill premium R
a  aws dAs=
R a 
awu dAu 2.81
Proportion of skilled 1   Aða Þ 0.11
Share of leisure expenditures R
a  ssðaÞdA þ
R a 
suðaÞdA 0.03
Cost of education to GDP eð1   Aða ÞÞ=y 0.01
5 Observe that setting zu ¼ 1 and calibrating zs amounts to calibrating the ratio zs=zu which is key in the determination of the relative demand for
skilled and unskilled workers.
6 The source is the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics: hhttp://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d03/tables/dt030.aspi.
7 The annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is 2%. The number used for GDP growth is then 1:02
50 ¼ 2:7:
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 245of the model. More precisely one can say that, conditional on matching the targets of Table 3, that is in particular the
change in high-school achievement and GDP growth, the model generates ð44   58Þ=ð41   58Þ¼82% of the decline in
hours between 1900 and 1950. It also generates most the contraction in the distribution of hours, as measured by the ratio
of hours of unskilled to skilled. Observe also that the model predicts a sizeable increase in the share of expenditures
devoted to leisure goods. This increase is of a magnitude similar to what is observed in the U.S. data: from 3% to 5.2% in the
model, vis a ` vis 3% to 5.8% in data.
With such results in hand, one can ask what the contribution of the driving forces in the model to the trends in hours
are. This question can be answered through a series of counterfactual exercises. For instance, what would have happened if
the price of the leisure goods did not decline, while everything else remained the same as in the baseline calibration?
Similarly, what would have happened if skill-speciﬁc technical parameters, such as zs, remained constant at their 1900
values, while other parameters changed as in the baseline calibration? Table 6 summarizes the results of such experiments.
It transpires that the most important driving force behind the trends in hours is technological progress associated with
skilled workers. It increases from 0.21 to 0.80 in the baseline case (see Table 4). Thus, holding it constant amounts to
shutting down the source of economic growth in the model and, therefore, agents increase their work effort. At the same
time the dispersion of hours decreases, that is skilled agents increase their work effort more than unskilled agents. Note
that the number of skilled agents hardly changes relative to the 1900 equilibrium and, since unskilled wages (per efﬁciency
units of labor) decrease, the skill premium increases. When zg is constant, the price of the leisure goods does not decline.
The change in hours becomes slightly less pronounced: a decline from 0.58 to 0.45, vis a ` vis 0.58 to 0.44 in the baseline
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Table 3
Free parameters and targets for the 1950 equilibrium
Free parameters zs;zu;zg;e
Moments Model’s counterpart Target
Price of leisure goods 1=zg 35% decline relative to 1900
GDP y 2% annual increase from 1900 to 1950
Cost of education to GDP eð1   Aða ÞÞ=y 0.03 in 1950
Proportion of skilled 1   Aða Þ 0.35 in 1950
Table 4
Baseline calibration
Preferences a ¼ 0:86, m ¼ 0:04, s ¼  1:05, r ¼ 0:00
Technology y ¼ 0:28
Distribution of abilities ma ¼ 0:5, sa ¼ 0:5
1900 zs ¼ 0:21, zu ¼ 1:0, zg ¼ 1:0, e ¼ 0:18













Leisure share of expenditures
Model (%) 3.0 5.2
Data (%) 3.0 5.8
G. Vandenbroucke / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33 (2009) 237–249 246case. Thus, the price of leisure goods accounts for ð45   44Þ=ð58   44Þ¼7% of the decline in the length of the average
workweek.
On the basis of this experiment, it is fair to say that the rise in real wages is the primary cause of the reduction in the
length of the workweek, and that changes in its distribution can be related to changes in the distribution of wages. The
price of leisure goods is second in importance in explaining the decline in hours. Its contribution is 7%. The reason for the
limited contribution of leisure goods to the trend in hours can be attributed to their near-unity elasticity of substitution
with leisure time. These results are likely to remain the same under an alternative calibration exercise. If, for example, the
parameter r was arbitrarily set to r ¼  1
2 instead of its baseline value, hours would decrease by 25% between 1900 and
1950 – they decrease by 24% in the baseline calibration.
4.3. Discussion
4.3.1. Preferences
Observe that, under the calibration presented in Table 4, preferences exhibit complementarity between consumption
and leisure (the composite of leisure time and leisure goods), since so0. Leisure goods and leisure time, however, have an
elasticity of substitution close to one. Remember that, in the calibration procedure, the restrictions imposed by the 1900
dispersion of hours and earnings as well as the recreation share of expenditures are driving this result. But which aspect of
the data is critical in the determination of a given parameter? Let us start with r, which governs the elasticity of
substitution between leisure time and leisure goods. A simple exercise to assess which moments determine r consists of
computing the 1900 equilibrium with a value for r arbitrarily set to  1
2 (r is about zero in the baseline calibration) while
leaving other parameters at their baseline value. Under this alternative calibration, the statistic which differs the most from
its baseline value is the share of leisure expenditures. It reaches 5.6% as opposed to 3% in the baseline calibration. Thus, the
low share of leisure expenditures observed in the 1900 U.S. economy is the reason for the low degree of complementarity
between leisure goods and leisure time, in the calibrated model.
At this point, note that the parameter r is important in determining the effect of the price of leisure goods on hours, in
the time series. Hence, one can ask whether a different calibration procedure would yield a signiﬁcantly different value for
r. An alternative strategy is, for example, to calibrate r in order to replicate the time series behavior of hours given that of
prices and the leisure share of expenditures. This was not the procedure chosen in this exercise, but it is possible to build a
back-of-the-envelope calculation to see how much of a difference in r this strategy delivers. Between 1900 and 1950, the
wage rate was multiplied by three – see Williamson (1995). Write this as w0=w ¼ 3:0. The price of leisure goods decreased
by 35% so p0=p ¼ 0:65, and hours decreased from 58 to 41 so h
0=h ¼ 0:70 while ‘0=‘ ¼ 1:40. The share of expenditures
devoted to leisure, s ¼ð pgÞ=ðwhÞ, was multiplied by two – from 3% to 6%. Given the observed change in prices and hours, the
change in g must have satisﬁed s0=s ¼ 2, which implies g0=g ¼ 6:3. These ﬁgures yields an elasticity of substitution between





ðg0=‘0   g=‘Þ=ðg=‘Þ
ðw0=p0   w=pÞ=ðw=pÞ
¼
6:3=1:4   1
3:0=0:65   1
’ 0:97.
This calculation suggests that a near-unity elasticity of substitution between leisure time and leisure goods is consistent
with the time-series behavior of prices, hours and the share of leisure expenditures. This value is close to the elasticity of
substitution implied by the calibrated value of r. Thus, it is likely that an exercise where r would be calibrated to the time
series behavior of hours and the share of leisure expenditures would deliver a similar value.
8 In fact, and as will become
clear shortly, the model predicts a large fraction of the time series behavior of hours and the leisure share of expenditures
under its baseline calibration.
The connection between the elasticity of substitution and the share of leisure expenditures can be understood as
follows. Suppose that there is a ‘strong’ degree of complementarity. As the leisure good becomes relatively cheaper the
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Table 6
Counterfactual experiments, 1950 moments
Experiment Average hours Distribution of hours Skill premium Number of skilled (%)
Baseline model 0.44 1.17 2.20 35
zs constant 0.69 1.13 3.29 6
zu constant 0.37 1.21 2.14 30
zg constant 0.45 1.17 2.20 35
8 The calculation presented here is only an indication of what the elasticity of substitution would be, if it was calibrated to time series data. Strictly
speaking, the elasticity of substitution measures the curvature along a given indifference curve. It is conceivable, however, that welfare changed between
1900 and 1950.
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however, he must increase his share of spending on the relatively more expensive good: leisure time; and decrease his
share of the relatively cheaper good: the leisure good. Thus, strong complementarity is not necessarily consistent with the
observed increase in the leisure share of expenditures.
Turn now to the parameter s. Compute the 1900 equilibrium with s ¼ 0 as opposed to s ¼  1:0 in the baseline
calibration. Under this alternative calibration, the statistics which are mostly affected are the total number of hours, which
increases to 86% (vis a ` vis 58 in the baseline), and the share of leisure expenditures, which decreases to 0.65%. The reason
for this is that more substitution between market and household goods implies a shift of resources away from leisure time
and goods. Thus, work time increases and the share of leisure expenditures decreases.
9
4.3.2. Sensitivity
In the exercise above, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of abilities are arbitrarily set toma ¼ sa ¼ 0:5.
To assess the sensitivity of the results to this choice, Table 7 reports the statistics for the 1950 equilibrium for alternative
values of ma and sa. In each case the model is calibrated as described in Section 4.1. The table shows that, conditional on
being calibrated to the same moments, the predictions of the model remain almost the same under alternative values for
the distribution of abilities.
4.3.3. The post-1950 period
McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) document a small decrease in hours from 1950 to 1970, and an increase between 1970
and 2000. In comparison with the changes observed and discussed earlier, the trend in the length of the workweek during
the post-1950 period is negligible. In addition, the distribution of hours at the end of the 20th century is reversed compared
with its 1900 counterpart: high-wage earners work longer hours than low-wage earners. Although this aspect of the data
was not investigated in this paper, one can think of the following mechanism to generate such changes. Suppose that there
is a ‘subsistence’ level of consumption, driving the income effect of wages on hours. In 1900, the low level of wages implies
that the income effect is strong for low-wage earners. Hence, they work longer hours. In 2000, the importance of the
income effect is much smaller because the general level of wages is high. It is then possible that a substitution effect
dominates, driven by another parameter in the utility function, and pushes high-wage earners to work more. Such a
mechanism would predict that the rise in wages may initially reduce average hours but eventually lead to an increase.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper explored the trends in the length of the workweek and its dispersion across workers during the ﬁrst half of
the 20th century. The hypothesis was that technological progress is the engine of such changes. Technological progress
affects wages and the price of recreation goods. The model exhibits an endogenous wage dispersion, generated by the
possibility for agents to purchase education. The model was calibrated to match moments of the U.S. economy in 1900.
Then, conditional on replicating the increase in the proportion of skilled workers and GDP per capita, it predicts 82% of the
observed decline in average hours, and most of the observed contraction in their dispersion. Counterfactual experiments
show that the decline in the price of leisure goods accounts for 7% of the total decline in hours.
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Hours (1950) Distribution of hours (1950) Skill premium (1950) Leisure share (1950)
Baseline model 0.44 1.17 2.20 5.2
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sa ¼ 0:52;ma ¼ 0:5 0.44 1.18 2.25 5.8
sa ¼ 0:48;ma ¼ 0:5 0.44 1.17 2.15 5.0
9 In the same spirit, setting the cost of education to zero yields a larger fraction of educated workers (12% as opposed to 11 in the baseline), and a
decline in the earnings ratio between skilled an unskilled: from 2.8 in the baseline to 2.6 when e ¼ 0. Finally, setting zs to 0.4 as opposed to 0.2 implies an
increase in the number of skilled workers from 11% to 20%.
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